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Abstract
Sorting of people on the labor market not only assures the most productive use of valuable
skills but also generates individual utility gains if people experience an optimal match between
job characteristics and their preferences. Based on individual data on subjective well-being it is
possible to assess these latter gains from matching. We introduce a two-equation ordered probit
model with endogenous switching and study self-selection into government and private sector
jobs. In an analysis with data from the European Social Survey, we find considerable gains from
matching amounting to an increase in the fraction of very satisfied workers from 53.8 to 58.8
percent relative to a hypothetical random allocation of workers to the two sectors. A companion
analysis of data from the German Socio-Economic Panel shows that selection on unobservables
is reduced once we include additional controls for preference heterogeneity.
JEL Classification: D60, I31, J24, J45
Keywords: Matching, ordered probit, public sector employment, selection, switching regression,
subjective well-being
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1 Introduction
The wealth and happiness of nations depend on the efficient allocation of labor. In order to get the
most out of the resources available in an economy, people must find their proper employer and vice
versa. Market forces are expected to bring about that skills are employed in their most productive
use so that goods and services are supplied at lowest costs. Sorting thus increases the wealth of
nations. This is the usual view about the importance of sorting and matching in the labor market
and its benefits for society. There is, however, another important consequence of sorting for the
happiness of nations. As the marginal worker determines the compensation for labor in its many
specificities, other workers individually get a rent if they experience an optimal match between
job characteristics and their preferences. They benefit from a utility premium, i.e. they get more
utility than what they require to stay in their current job. These private benefits from sorting and
matching are the larger the more heterogeneous the preferences are in a society ceteris paribus.1
Imagine the case of an individual for whom the service for society is close to her heart. She
might enjoy great satisfaction from working in a specific government position. To the extent that
she would be willing to do the job for a lower compensation than the actual salary received (in order
to guarantee the provision of government services at large) she benefits from a utility premium due
to optimal matching.
These arguments about the gains from self-selection involve fundamental aspects of individual
well-being and utility maximization. On the one hand, rents from matching are seen as a substantive
source of well-being. On the other hand, self-selection and accordingly assortative matching are
claims about individual rational decision-making. Both claims are inherently difficult to evaluate
based on revealed behavior and compensating wage differentials. What are the job characteristics
people have formed preferences about? How can these characteristics be measured and how are the
respective preferences distributed?
In this paper, we take advantage of the recent revolution in economics: the measurement of
1An excellent account of the theory of equalizing differences in the labor market is provided in Rosen (1986).
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individual subjective well-being and its application as a proxy measure for utility (e.g. Frey and
Stutzer 2002b). Reported well-being provides an assessment of a situation based on individuals’
subjective evaluation and weighting. This allows for directly studying the consequences of individual
self-selection. In particular, it is possible to assess people’s potential gains in well-being from
working in their job rather than in some alternative one.2
We proceed in two stages. First, an econometric model is developed to study self-selection with
data on reported subjective well-being which are ordinal in nature. The model we introduce is
a two-equation ordered probit model with endogenous switching. Our model formalizes the idea
that (i) the well-being experienced from working in a particular job is individual specific, and that
(ii) people may select the job they work in based on relative advantage (i.e., maximize subjective
well-being). The potential of the model in research on the determinants of individual well-being
(and elsewhere) goes far beyond the application in this paper.
Second, the gains from matching in the labor market are quantified for the specific sorting of
workers into either government or private sector jobs. In our paper, the sorting is based on a full
utility comparison, taking into account all relevant job attributes. This broader view is different
from, and complementary to, the traditional focus on public-private sector wage differentials and
related sorting issues (Gregory and Borland, 1999, Borjas, 2003). We assume that firms cannot
perfectly wage-discriminate between workers and that well-being rents accrue thus to workers.
Furthermore, we assume that switching between sectors is relatively low cost, so that it is meaningful
to compare the present day allocation of workers and well-being levels even though many of these
workers have made their actual career choices many years in the past.
The gains in individual well-being from matching are obtained by comparing the actual distri-
bution in reported life satisfaction with a hypothetical one, where workers are randomly allocated
to government or private sector jobs, keeping the size of the two sectors equal to the actual size.
In our empirical analysis based on the first two waves of the European Social Survey and the
2How specific job characteristics are evaluated by workers is studied in a rich related literature on job satisfaction
(for a review, see Warr 1999).
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2004 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel, we find strong evidence for self-selection. The
observed pattern is one of selection based on comparative advantage. Government sector workers
are those who gain the most from being in that sector. As a consequence, there are considerable
gains in subjective well-being from matching. The actual allocation increases the overall fraction of
“very satisfied” workers (reporting a life satisfaction score of 8 or above on a 0-10 response scale)
by five percentage points (from 53.8 to 58.8 percent) relative to a hypothetical random allocation
of workers to the two sectors.
In the next section, we present further motivation as to the importance os sorting of public
and private sector employment. Section 3 introduces the empirical framework. At the core is
a structural ordered probit model with endogenous switching, the parameters of which can be
estimated by maximum likelihood. A discussion of general issues regarding the measurement of
well-being, and of the data used from the European Social Survey and the German Socio-Economic
Panel are part of Section 4. The results are presented in Sections 5. Section 6 offers concluding
remarks.
2 Heterogeneous Preferences and Sorting in the Labor Market
The sorting of workers into government and private sector jobs is a prominent research question
in labor economics for several reasons. In many countries, a substantial part of economic activity
takes place in the government sector. More importantly, however, the government and private
sector differ in various institutional and structural aspects with profound consequences for the
workers in these two sectors. First, public agencies have some special features, most notably the
multiplicity of principals and tasks and the non-market nature of their output, which prevent the
use of explicit incentives. Instead, the government sector is characterized by low powered incentives,
a flat wage structure and promotions based on the principle of seniority (e.g. Dixit 2002). Second,
mission-oriented occupations, i.e. occupations connected to the provision of collective goods, are
highly concentrated in the public sector (Besley and Ghatak 2005). Finally, public sector employees
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enjoy a higher job security than their private sector counterparts. In most countries public servants
are better protected against dismissal and the threat of bankruptcy is virtually absent. Therefore,
it stands to reason that the government sector attracts workers with strong preferences for job
security and a strong sense of responsibility for the society, but, probably less career concerns.3
Circumstantial evidence on heterogeneity in job characteristics and job holders’ preferences in
the public and private sector is provided in the International Social Survey Program on Work
Orientations in 1997. It elicits respondents’ preferences for various job characteristics. Figure 1
shows that government sector employees rate opportunities for advancement as less important, and
job security and usefulness of their work to the society as more important on a six point scale
than private sector employees. Figure 1 also reveals a second important fact. Public employees not
only have different preferences regarding these job characteristics, they also perceive their jobs as
more secure and more useful to society but with less prospects for advancement than employees in
the private sector. It is exactly this match between preferences and job characteristics that entails
potentially important gains in happiness.
−−−−−−−−−
Figure 1 about here
−−−−−−−−−
Given that many forces aggravate the proper sorting of people into government and private jobs,
at least four different outcomes are possible. First, despite the obstacles in market adjustment and
in workers’ self-selection, an almost optimal sorting might be observed. Second, most people might
be better off in the government sector but only a fraction of people can actually work there. This
might be due to rationing and indicates general sector specific rents. Third, the opposite might occur
3The literature has, indeed, documented that civil servants are more risk averse than private sector employees
(Bellante and Link 1981; Hartog et al. 2002) and show a specific public service motivation (e.g. Kelman 1987,
Crewson 1997). Clark and Postel-Vinay (2005) find that workers in permanent public sector jobs report the highest
perceived job security.
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and almost everybody might be better off in the private sector. This might, for example be the case
if efficiency wages in the private sector create advantages for the insiders but generate involuntary
unemployment, and reduce the attractiveness of public sector employment. Finally, some people
might be in their preferred sector while others are not. Thus there is a partial mismatch involving
costs in terms of well-being.
3 The Model
The empirical framework is developed in two stages. First, the well-being functions of public and
private sector workers are analysed in the context of a pure Roy model. In such a model, the
selection effect is always non-negative. Second, the model is augmented by a generalized selection
equation and extended to the case of ordinal dependent variables.
3.1 A switching regression model of public and private sector well-being
There are two sectors in our model, the government sector (s = 1), and the private sector (s = 0).
The sector-specific equations for individual well-being in the two sectors are
y∗s = x
′βs + us , s = 0, 1 (1)
where x is a (k × 1) vector of explanatory variables that is the same in both equations, and βs are
conformable sector-specific parameter vectors. We do not impose that β0 = β1 as the well-being
returns to certain characteristics (such as education or being female) may be higher in one sector
than in the other.
The sector specific error term us measures preference heterogeneity. Such heterogeneity arises
since workers differ in their implicit valuation of the attributes of public and private sector jobs. For
example, for workers with a strong preference for job security and a strong sense of responsibility for
society, attributes typically associated with the public sector, we would observe in the framework
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of this model that u1 > u0.4
This is a typical switching regression framework. We observe either individual well-being in
sector 1 (for workers who decided to work in sector 1), or individual well-being in sector 0 (for
workers who decided to work in sector 0), but never both. It is a logical impossibility to know
for sure what the well-being of workers in sector 1 would be if they worked in sector 0, and vice
versa. However, the difference in an individual’s well-being between the two sectors, one observed
and one unobserved, is precisely the worker specific potential utility premium from matching we
are interested in.
Under some additional identifying assumptions, it becomes possible to reconstruct the counter-
factual well-being using econometric techniques. In particular, assume that
u0 ∼ N(0, 1)
u1 ∼ N(0, 1)
corr(u0, u1) = ρ
The normalization of the variances is introduced already at this stage in anticipation of the fact
that only class membership of a partition of the real line is observed, i.e. the estimable model
will have an ordered probit structure. Otherwise, the model has all the features of the standard
Roy model for two continuous outcomes (see Roy, 1951, Borjas, 1987). If ρ > 0, then workers
with an above average well-being in sector 1 also enjoy above average well-being in sector 0. The
extreme case would be a perfect positive correlation, such that ρ = +1. In this case, u0 = u1 and
there are no idiosyncratic gains to matching; in this case people differ in their unobserved intrinsic
well-being level (e.g., personality), but these differences are unrelated to the sector they might work
in. If ρ is less than one, there are sector specific gains to be made, i.e., people have comparative
well-being gains in one of the sectors, and we would expect that people self-select into sectors based
4A broader concept of preference heterogeneity allows for heterogeneity in the slope parameters βs as well. In
a polar case, βsi = βi, i.e., differences in slopes across sectors are entirely due to worker heterogeneity. Such
heterogeneity would have some effect on the interpretation, as indicated in the results section below, but would not
invalidate the model structure per-se.
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on comparative advantage. Workers with a positive preference for sector 1 will end up in sector 1,
and workers with a positive preference for sector 0 will work in sector 0.
This idea can be formalized by assuming that individuals self-select into sectors 0 and 1 based
on maximization of well-being. In its strictest form, the maximization hypothesis implies that we




1 if u1 − u0 > x′(β0 − β1)
0 if u1 − u0 ≤ x′(β0 − β1)
(2)
To answer the question whether workers who chose to work in sector s have a higher or lower well-
being than workers randomly assigned to that sector, i.e., whether they are positively or negatively
selected, the key parameter is the correlation between u1 − u0 and us. As is well known, in this
set-up,
E(y∗s |x, s = 1) = x′β1 + E(u1|u1 − u0 > x′(β0 − β1))
= x′β1 + corr(u1, u1 − u0)φ(x
′(β1 − β0)/σ)
Φ(x′(β1 − β0)/σ) (3)
and
E(y∗s |x, s = 0) = x′β0 + E(u0|u1 − u0 ≤ x′(β0 − β1))
= x′β0 − corr(u0, u1 − u0) φ(x
′(β1 − β0)/σ)
1− Φ(x′(β1 − β0)/σ) (4)
where σ =
√
Var(u1 − u0) = 2(1− ρ). Under the assumptions of the model,
corr(us, u1 − u0) = (2s− 1)
√
(1− ρ)/2 s = 0, 1
If s = 1, the correlation is bounded from below at zero and the overall selection effect is nonnegative.
Those more likely to select into sector 1 have an above average well-being in that sector. For
example, for ρ = 0, corr(u1, u1 − u0) = 1/
√
2.
If s = 0, the correlation is bounded from above at zero. Again, the overall selection effect is
nonnegative. Those less likely to select into sector 1, and more likely into sector 0, have above
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average well-being in sector 0. Hence, both groups are positively selected for all interior values of
ρ. Only if ρ = +1 does the correlation, and thus the self-selection bias, disappear.5
In important ways, this selection model is likely to be too restrictive. At an empirical level, we
would prefer a model that does not restrict the selection effect to be non-negative a priori. At a
theoretical level, individual maximization of well-being may not be the only determinant of sector
allocation, for example due to demand constraints. If the number of people wanting to work in
a given sector (the labor supply) exceeds the number of available jobs (the labor demand), the
selection rule is affected by the rationing mechanism. While we do not model this mechanism
explicitly, we allow for the possibility that selection is affected in both observed and unobserved
ways. Let z denote observed characteristics that relate to selection into the public sector, and let
ν denote the unobserved characteristics. Then, a generalized selection rule can be based on the
inequality u1 − u0 + ν > x′(β0 − β1)− z˜′γ˜, or, in general form
s =

1 if ε > −z′γ
0 if ε ≤ −z′γ
(5)
where ε = u1−u0+ν. z should include all variables that determine well-being (i.e., x). In addition,
it can include variables z˜ that affect the demand for workers in a given sector, but not the supply.
One example would be citizenship if, as is the case in many countries, citizens have preferential
access to all or part of government sector employment. Moreover, assume that ε ∼ N(0, 1), and
denote the correlation between ε and u1, u0 as ρ1 and ρ0, respectively.
The model allows for very general patterns of selection on unobservables. The treatment effects
in the latent model are
E(y∗1|x, s = 1)− E(y∗0|x, s = 1) = x′(β1 − β0) + E(u1 − u0|s = 1)
= x′(β1 − β0) + (ρ1 − ρ0)φ(z
′γ)
Φ(z′γ)
5This result differs from the Roy model where negative selection is possible. Negative selection in sector 0 requires
that ρ > 0 and σ20 < σ
2




1 are the error variances of sector 0 and sector 1, respectively. With variances
normalized to one, this case is precluded in the present setup.
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for public sector workers, and
E(y∗0|x, s = 0)− E(y∗1|x, s = 0) = x′(β0 − β1) + E(u0 − u1|s = 0)
= x′(β0 − β1) + (ρ1 − ρ0) φ(z
′γ)
1− Φ(z′γ)
for private sector workers. The following cases can be distinguished:
a) There is self-selection based on comparative advantage. This occurs whenever ρ1 > ρ0. In
this case, ε > 0 (an above average probability of being in the public sector) implies that
E(u1 − u0|ε) = (ρ1 − ρ0)ε > 0.
b) There is self-selection based on comparative disadvantage. This occurs for ρ1 < ρ0.
c) There is no self-selection based on comparative advantage or disadvantage. This occurs
whenever ρ1 = ρ0 = 0.
d) An intermediate case arises when ρ1 = ρ0 6= 0. While the well-being of private sector workers
is not a valid counterfactual for the well-being of public sector worker in the private sector,
there are no gains from matching: moving a sector 1 worker to sector 0 leads to a well-being
change that is just equal to minus the well-being change of moving a sector 0 worker to sector
1, and aggregate well-being is unchanged.
3.2 An ordered response model with endogenous switching
We now present an extension of the standard regression model to ordinal dependent variables.6 This
is necessary since the outcomes y∗0 and y∗1, in our case people’s true well-being, are unobserved.
Instead, we observe the ordered discrete responses ys = 0, . . . , 10, i.e., people’s judgments about
their subjective well-being, such that
ys = j if and only if κs,j < y∗s ≤ κs,j+1 (6)
6A closely related model was developed independently by DeVaro (2006) where the outcome variable is an ordered
indicator of the financial performance of a firm as a function of team production.
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where y∗s = x′βs + us, s = 0, 1, and the threshold values κs,j , j = 0, 1, . . . , 10 form a partition of
the real line i.e., κ0 = −∞, κ11 =∞, and κs,j+1 > κs,j ∀j. This is not an ordinary ordered probit
model since the probability of observing ys = j depends on the outcome of the selection variable s,
and s and ys are not independent. We have
P (y1 = j, s = 1|x, z) = P (κ1,j − x′β1 < u1 ≤ κ1,j+1 − x′β1, ε > −z′γ)
= P (κ1,j+1 − x′β1 < u1,−ε < z′γ)− P (κ1,j − x′β1 < u1,−ε < z′γ)
P (y0 = j, s = 0|x, z) = P (κ0,j+1 − x′β0 < u0 ≤ κ0,j − x′β0, ε ≤ −z′γ)
= P (κ0,j+1 − x′β0 < u0, ε ≤ −z′γ)− P (κ0,j − x′β0 < u0,−ε ≤ −z′γ)
If u1 and u0 were both uncorrelated with ε, the joint probabilities could be factored into a standard
ordered probit part and a standard probit part. With correlation, such a factorization is not
possible. Then, for ε ∼ N(0, 1), u1 ∼ N(0, 1), u0 ∼ N(0, 1), corr(ε, u1) = ρ1, and corr(ε, u0) = ρ0,
P (y1 = j, s = 1|x, z) = Φ2(κ1,j+1 − x′β1, z′γ,−ρ1)− Φ2(κ1,j − x′β1, z′γ,−ρ1) (7)
P (y0 = j, s = 0|x, z) = Φ2(κ0,j+1 − x′β0,−z′γ, ρ0)− Φ2(κ0,j − x′β0,−z′γ, ρ0) (8)
where Φ2 denotes the cumulative density function of the bivariate standard normal distribution.
The parameters of the model, θ = (κ1, κ0, β1, β0, γ, ρ1, ρ0)′, can be estimated by maximum likelihood
without much difficulty. Given an independent sample of observation tuples (yi, si, xi, zi), the
likelihood function is simply
L(θ; y, s, x, z) =
n∏
i=1
P (ys, s|x, z) (9)
Under the assumptions of the model, the maximum likelihood estimator has the desirable large
sample properties.
3.3 Identification
Our model is parametrically identified by functional form assumptions. Formally, identification
does not require any exclusion restrictions, or “instruments”, that are sometimes evoked in such
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context. In our experience, estimation of the switching regression ordered probit model appears to
be much more stable than estimating a corresponding linear model, maybe due to the additional
non-linearities that in practice avoid the near multicollinearity of the inverse Mills ratio causing
problems in the context of the linear switching regression model.
We have to make such strong assumptions since we are asking a lot from the data. To estimate
well-being rents, we need to estimate what is known in the evaluation literature as the “treatment
effect on the treated” (and the “non-treatment effect on the non-treated”), where working in the
public sector is given the interpretation of a treatment. In a world with self-selection based on
idiosyncratic gains, these effects are in general not identifiable with instrumental variables, as the
estimand of the IV estimator is the local average treatment effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) which
differs in general from the treatment effect on the treated. Relatedly, Heckman (1990) has shown
that the generalized Roy model is not non-parametrically identified for finite valued instruments.
Our results are thus dependent on the parametric model assumptions. While chosen to some
extent for computational convenience, they are not entirely arbitrary either. The trivariate normal
assumption for the errors in the latent model, if combined with a threshold mechanism, allows for
very general distributions for the discrete outcomes, including skewed and multi-modal distribu-
tions. The main restriction implied by the normal assumption is the linearity of the conditional
expectation function of the outcome error given the selection error. This can be seen as a first order
approximation to the true function. Alternative models could be used, such as the multivariate-t
distribution or discrete factor models.
3.4 Implementation Issues
To obtain starting values, we first estimate for each sector a cardinalized ordered probit model by
OLS, as suggested by van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004). Based on this method, the threshold
values κ1-κ10 are obtained from the marginal distribution of y. Let pk denote the proportion of
observations in the sample with y < k. Then κ˜k = Φ−1(pk). Moreover, the conditional expectation
E(y∗|y = k) can be estimated as (φ(κ˜k)− φ(κ˜k+1))/(Φ(κ˜k+1)− Φ(κ˜k)). The slope parameters are
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obtained by regressing these conditional expectations on x, separately for the two sectors. Finally,
the starting values for the selection equation are obtained from a few Newton-Raphson steps of a
Logit model. The resulting parameters are divided by 1.6 to approximate the probit coefficients.
The full simultaneous log-likelihood function is then maximized using the BFGS algorithm with
numerical first and second derivatives as implemented in GAUSS. We experienced no convergence
difficulties.
4 Data
For our empirical analysis, we selected two recent datasets, both cross-sectional in nature. The first
dataset was extracted from the first (2002) and second (2004) waves of the European Social Survey
(ESS). The ESS is a repeated cross-section survey covering more than 20 European countries. The
second dataset was generated from the 2004 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
For the question at hand, each of the datasets has some advantages and some disadvantages,
which makes the inclusion of results from both informative. The advantage of the ESS is the
relatively large sample size; moreover, it covers a majority of European countries which makes it
possible – at least in principle – to study questions about the effect of institutions on the well-being
of public and private sector workers. While we don’t report such results in this paper, this is
an intended area of future work. One disadvantage of the ESS is that public sector status is not
directly available in the data. It has to be inferred from the industry classification, which may lead
to classification error.
The GSOEP does not have this limitation, since a direct question on working in the public
sector is available. Our main motivation to include the GSOEP is a different one, however: the
2004 wave (and only this wave - hence the restriction to a single cross-section) includes a number of
questions on preference heterogeneity that may be related to public and private sector well-being.
The possibility to directly control for such preference effects will provide differentiated insights into
the sorting of workers based on observed and unobserved characteristics.
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4.1 Reported Subjective Well-Being
In order to study the welfare gains from matching directly (as proposed in our model), individual
well-being has to be measured. We take advantage of extensive prior research in psychology where
simple instruments for measuring well-being have been developed and validated, namely the people’s
reports of satisfaction with their life and their job, as well as reports of happiness.7
Following the economic tradition of not second guessing the judgment of the persons directly
involved, it appears only reasonable to consider people as best judges of the overall quality of
their life. With the help of representative surveys, it is possible to get indications of individuals’
evaluation of their life satisfaction. Behind the score indicated by respondents lies a cognitive
assessment on the extent to which they judge the overall quality of their lives in a favorable way.
This includes the match between their preferred characteristics of a job and the ones they actually
experience. Measures of life and job satisfaction, as well as happiness passed a series of validation
exercises and seem to significantly correlate with true positive inner feelings (see Frey and Stutzer
2002a;b for introductions to the economics of happiness and references to the validation literature
in psychology).
Various contributions demonstrate that the study of data on domain satisfaction, life satisfaction
and happiness can provide new and complementary insights in economics. Recent findings are with
regard to the macro-economic determinants of individual well-being (e.g. Di Tella, MacCulloch
and Oswald 2003), the relationship between income and happiness (e.g. Clark et al. 2006, Frijters
et al. 2004, Stutzer 2004, Luttmer 2005), the valuation of public goods (e.g. Frey, Luechinger and
Stutzer 2004, van Praag and Baarsma 2005) or the evaluation of public policy (e.g. Gruber and
Mullainathan 2005).
Data on reported subjective well-being are discrete and ordinal. The particular numerical labels
attached to the response scale, here y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10}, indicate only an ordering. Any monotonic
7A comprehensive review is provided in the edited volume titled Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psy-
chology (Kahneman et al. 1999).
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transformation z = g(y), g′(y) > 0, conveys the same information. A direct consequence is that,
strictly speaking, expected values and regression models are not meaningful for such data. Since
there are only 11 discrete outcomes, it is better to model the response probabilities directly. This
becomes imperative if one wants to use the model to predict the probabilities of specific outcomes,
and their dependence on exogenous factors. The ordered probit model provides a framework for
discrete and ordered responses, and we use here its generalization to endogenous switching.
4.2 European Social Survey
The European Social Survey (ESS) data were extracted from the first (2002) and second (2004)
waves of the ESS. Our definition of government sector includes people working either in the public
administration, defense, or in education. The dummy variable is constructed on the basis of in-
formation on the respondents’ industry (according to the EU industry classification, NACE Rev.
1). Other employed or self-employed people are in the reference category; respondents that were
neither employed nor self-employed in the week preceding the interview or whose main income
source is neither wage nor income from self-employment are excluded. In order to increase the
homogeneity of the sample, the analysis is restricted to non-transformation countries, leaving us
with a total of 29,584 observations from people active on the labor market.8 The sample averages
of the explanatory variables are displayed in the first column of Table 2: the proportion of public
sector workers is 16 percent, the average age is 41 years, 45 percent are women, 58 percent are
married, and the average education level corresponds to 12.9 years of schooling.
The dependent variable is overall satisfaction with life, elicited with the following question:
’All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?’ Individuals are
asked to state their life satisfaction on a scale from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely
satisfied). For our sample of European workers, average satisfaction with life is 7.42 score points
8The sample includes observations from the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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with a standard deviation of 1.93 . Almost 60 percent report a satisfaction score of 8 or above.
−−−−−−−−−
Figure 2 about here
−−−−−−−−−
Figure 2 shows that there are some sector specific well-being differences: a higher proportion
of government sector employees responds with values 8, 9 or 10. Whether this is a causal effect, in
the sense of a treatment effect on the treated, is yet to be seen.
4.3 German Socio-Economic Panel
The GSOEP data have been frequently used in prior well-being research. Here, our interest focuses
on a single cross-section, the 2004 wave of the data. In that year, participants were asked a number
of questions on risk attitudes as well as other values they hold. In particular, they were asked about
the importance they place on the following three aspects of life: having a successful career; helping
other people; being engaged in social and political activities. Our conjecture is that career oriented
individuals and those willing to take higher risks are more likely to be found in the private sector,
whereas individuals who put more importance on helping and public service tend to be matched
to the public sector.9 Table 1 shows, for a sample of 4,181 employed men from the West German
sample, that our conjecture finds some support in the data.
−−−−−−−−−
Table 1 about here
−−−−−−−−−
The importance questions are asked on a four point scale, with responses “unimportant / not
very important / important / very important”. Table 1 shows the proportion of individuals in
9Such a reasoning supposes that such preferences are stable over time, a claim that we cannot verify with the data,
as we only have a single cross-section. The same correlation would result if individuals adjusted their preferences
after being matched to a particular sector, in order to avoid cognitive dissonance.
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each sector reponding with “important” or “very important”. We find significant differences for
the proportion of individuals looking for a successful career (more prevalent in the private sector)
and for the proportion of individuals finding active citizenship to be important (more prevalent
in the public sector). Private sector workers are also more willing to take risks. The difference is
statistically significant, although rather small (a 0.2 difference on the 0-10 scale).
There are some other noteworthy aspects that distinguish our GSOEP sample from the ESS
data. First, we use job satisfaction, rather than overall satisfaction with life, as outcome variable.
Arguably, the selection into private and public sector employment should be most directly linked to
job satisfaction. Again, this variable is measured on a 0-10 scale. Because of low responses in the
0-2 range, we combined them into a single outcome, using 8 ordered outcome categories (instead
of 11). Second, we use an “objective” measure of health which is a caseness score generated from
an eight items list of ailments (difficulties of climbing stairs, impairment in daily activities, job,
or social contacts due to physical or emotional problems, strong pain). Last but not least, we
mentioned already before that the GSOEP has a direct question on public sector employment.
Therefore, we do not need to use an industry based definition for these data.
5 Results
The empirical findings are presented in four subsections. We start with a presentation of conven-
tional ordered probit happiness estimates based on the ESS data. We then use the same data to
contrast the simple methods with our structural switching regression models with self-selection.
We use the results to establish the relative importance of observables and unobservables for the
selection into public sector jobs. In a third part we repeat the analysis with GSOEP data using
relatively detailed information on preference heterogeneity. Finally, in a fourth part, we employ
the results to quantify the overall effect of sorting on the aggregate distribution of well-being.
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5.1 Conventional Ordered Probit Happiness Models
The prevailing methodological approach is exemplified by columns 2 and 3 of Table 2, which shows
estimates based on ESS data. In this approach, the data for public and private sector workers
are pooled, and the coefficient on the dummy variable for public sector measures the difference in
the estimated ordered probit index between public and private sector workers. Without additional
controls, we obtain a coefficient of +0.080, which is statistically significant. Essentially, this estimate
reproduces the evidence from Figure 2 that public sector workers are somewhat more likely than
private sector workers to be found in the 8-10 range of the happiness scale. For example, the
predicted probability that a public sector worker scores a 10 is 1− Φ(1.25− 0.08) = 12.1 percent,
where 1.25 is the rightmost threshold estimate and Φ is the distribution function of the standard
normal. The predicted probability of a 10-score is 1 − Φ(1.25) = 10.6 percent for a private sector
worker. Thus, there is a 1.5 percentage point difference between the two types of workers.
Of course, there are many reasons why public sector workers could be happier than private
sector workers, other than their sector of work per se. To control for observable differences, the
third column of Table 2 includes a number of covariates, including a second order polynomial in
age, education level and marital status. As soon as we include these few additional variables, the
public sector well-being premium shrinks in size, and it is no longer statistically significant. The
average public sector worker appears to be equally well of in either sector. There is no evidence for
rents.
A simple extension of the basic model introduces sector-specific happiness coefficients. This is
shown in columns 4-6 of Table 2. Estimation of such a model is very simple as long as we assume
exogenous switching, an assumption that should (and will) of course be tested. Under exogeneity,
the parameters can be estimated by simply running separate ordered probit models on the subset
of public and private sector workers, respectively. In addition, column 6 shows a binary probit
model for the decision to work in the public sector.
We can use these results to offer a test of the importance of sector specific well-being returns.
17
The standard model (in column 3) is nested in the more general two-equation model. The number
of restrictions is equal to the number of estimated slope parameters plus the number of threshold
parameters minus one (because the restricted model has a sector specific intercept). There are 17
such restrictions in total. The likelihood ratio statistic is 44.0, the p-value close to zero, and the
null hypothesis of constant parameters is thus rejected. The estimated well-being premia for being
female and married are larger in the public sector than in the private sector. Having a father who
worked in the public sector appears to have no affect on either public or private sector well-being,
although it positively affects the probability of working in the public sector.
5.2 Switching Ordered Probit Models with Self-Selection
The full estimation results for the endogenous switching model, based on the 2002/2004 ESS sample,
are given in Table 3. The model is estimated in two versions. In a first version (Model 1), the two
variables “Citizen” and “Father in Public Sector” are excluded from the outcome equations but
included in the selection equation. In many countries, government jobs are, at least partly, available
for citizens only. Moreover, personal contacts are an important source of information about the
availability of jobs and job conditions (Lewis and Frank, 2002) and father’s occupation may thus
affect the offspring’s sector choice.10 In Model 2, these two variables are included in the outcome
equations as well.
We can now perform two tests, a first one for the null hypothesis of exogenous switching, and
a second one for the exclusion restriction. For the first, we compare the exogenous switching
model estimated in Table 2 with Model 2 in Table 3. A likelihood ratio test clearly rejects the
exogenous switching model against the model with endogenous switching, as the log-likelihoods for
10To be precise, we observe whether or not the father works in a modern professional occupation. Such occupations
are highly concentrated in, although not exclusively restricted to, the government sector. Another potential deter-
minant of sector choice would be the location of residence. If a person lives nearby major government institutions,
for example in the capital, this should increase the probability of such employment. Unfortunately, the ESS does not
provide detailed geographic information.
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the two models are -68’996 (the sum of -56’742.3 and -12’253.4) and -68’970, respectively, with two
additional parameters in the general model. Thus, endogenous selection based on unobservables
is a signature feature of the data. The second test, of Model 1 against Model 2 shows that the
exclusion restrictions cannot be rejected, so that we focus in the following discussion on the results
for Model 1, shown in the first three columns of the Table.
−−−−−−−−−
Table 3 about here
−−−−−−−−−
The correlation between selection into the government sector and well-being in the government
sector is close to zero and statistically insignificant, whereas the correlation between selection into
the government sector and well-being in the private sector is large, negative, and statistically
significant. Moreover, we can reject the null hypothesis: H0 : ρ1 − ρ0 = 0 against the alternative
H1 : ρ1 − ρ0 > 0. The difference in the coefficients is 0.558, with estimated standard error equal
to 0.204. The results are qualitatively similar in Model 2, although we see that the estimated
ρ1 parameter has a very large standard error in that model, whereas the exclusion restriction in
Model 1 helps to pin that coefficient down more precisely. Overall, there is evidence for endogenous
selection based on comparative advantage, and ignoring this selection produces spurious estimates
of the effect of sector choice on well-being.
Selection on observables
We first consider parameter heterogeneity across the two outcome equations. For example in
Model 1, household size has a significant positive effect on life satisfaction in the private sector
equation, but not so in the public sector equation. More intriguingly, one can compare the effect
of explanatory variables in the selection and outcome equations. Such a comparison is interesting
since according to the maximization hypothesis, people should tend to prefer the sector where the
returns are largest.
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Education, has no effect on well-being, but it is highly significant in the selection equation. One
interpretation is that education affects selection not through labor supply (what employees want)
but rather through labor demand (what employers want). The same can be said about the variable
female.
Just the opposite case arises for the variable “marital status”. Here, there are significant effects
in both outcome equations but it is insignificant in the selection equation. One has to be cautious
when comparing coefficients across outcome equations, since their relationship to the outcome
distribution is moderated through thresholds that vary in the two equations. However, when we
compute the predicted effect of marriage on the probability of being very satisfied (a score of 8
or higher on the 0-10 scale), for an otherwise average person, one finds indeed a stronger effect in
the government sector (+10 percentage points compared to +6.7 percentage points). One would
therefore expect that married people select themselves into the government sector because the
benefits from that characteristic is largest there. While the positive estimate of being married in
the selection equation points in the right direction, the hypothesis of no selection based on marital
status cannot be rejected.11
In order to assess the overall evidence for positive or negative selection based on observables, we
compute the combined effect of all characteristics. Let x¯1 denote the sample mean of these charac-
teristics among government employees, and x¯0 the sample mean among private sector employees.
The predicted satisfaction distribution of an average government worker in the government sector,
unconditional on selection but conditional on x¯1, is then
̂P (y1 = j|x¯1) = Φ(κˆ1,j+1 − x¯′1βˆ1)− Φ(κˆ1,j − x¯′1βˆ1)
whereas the predicted satisfaction distribution of an average private sector worker in the government
11A possible explanation for the absence of an effect in the selection equation is that the differences in returns to
marriage reflect sector-independent preference heterogeneity. In this interpretation, government sector workers would
retain their above average well-being premium from being married even if they were to move to the private sector.
As a consequence, marital status need not affect sectoral choice.
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sector is
̂P (y1 = j|x¯0) = Φ(κˆ1,j+1 − x¯′0βˆ1)− Φ(κˆ1,j − x¯′0βˆ1)
Based on our parameter estimates and sample means it turns out that the difference between these
distributions is small, although there is some evidence for positive selection based on observables.
For example, the predicted probability of being very satisfied in the government sector (defined as
an outcome of 8 or above, i.e., P (y1 ≥ 8)) is by 0.4 percentage points higher among government
workers than among private sector workers. Similarly, the predicted probability of being very
satisfied in the private sector (P (y0 ≥ 8)) is by 0.2 percentage points higher among private sector
workers than among government workers.12
Selection on unobservables
The influence of self-selection can be computed at any value of the outcome distribution. For
illustrative purposes, we focus again on the probability of reporting a high level of life satisfaction,
defined as a score of 8 or higher on the 0-10 scale. This probability can be expressed as a function
of the selection error, since
P (ys ≥ 8|ε) = P (y∗s ≥ κs,8|ε)
= 1− P (x′βs + us < κs,8|ε)
= 1− Φ
(
κs,8 − x′βs − ρsε√
1− ρ2s
)
Figure 3 plots this function for s = 0, 1, for an average person (x = x¯), and for ε ∈ (−2, 2), based on
the parameter estimates from Model 1 in Table 3. Since the marginal distribution of ε is standard
normal, this range covers approximately 95 percent of all possible cases. A large ε means that the
person is likely to work in the government sector. The selection rule formally requires that εi > z′iγ,
12These estimates are based on the assumption that differences in returns are sector related. If they reflect preference
heterogeneity instead, the gains from matching on observables will be even smaller, or non-existent altogether.
However, in either case, most of the gains from matching remain as they result from selection based on unobservables.
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so that the cut-off for selection into the government sector is individual specific. However, we know
that 16 percent of all persons in the sample work in the government sector. Therefore, an otherwise
average person is allocated to the government sector as long as ε > Φ−1(0.84) ≈ 1.
From Figure 3, we see that predicted government workers (those with a high ε in the selection
equation) tend to be less satisfied than predicted private sector workers, regardless of the sector
they work in. However, they would be much worse off if allocated to the private sector. Thus they
gain the most from working in the government sector, which is a manifestation of self-selection
based on comparative advantage.
−−−−−−−−−
Figure 3 about here
−−−−−−−−−
The two satisfaction curves in Figure 3 intersect when ε is approximately minus one. Thus
it would be optimal if all workers on the left of the intersection, where workers maximize their
satisfaction by working in the private sector, would actually work in the private sector. Similarly,
all workers with ε ≥ −1 should work in the government sector. This does not happen however
since, as we saw above, much fewer people work in the government sector. The actual threshold
is around ε ≥ +1. Within the formal structure of our model, the fact that more workers find it
optimal to work in the government sector than actually do can be explained by a restricted labor
demand in that sector. The fact that there are queues for government jobs is well known and has
been analysed before (e.g., Krueger, 1988). The novel insight here is that into the nature of the
rationing mechanism, namely that government workers are those who gain most from working in
that sector.
Finally, we also observe that private sector workers have on average only a slightly lower prob-
ability of reporting a high satisfaction than government workers. This can be seen from Figure 3,
by averaging over the government satisfaction locus for ε ≥ 1, and over the private sector satis-
faction locus for ε < 1. Formally, the probability of high satisfaction for an average person in the
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government sector is




P (ys ≥ 8|ε < c) = 1− Φ2(κ0,8 − x
′β0, c, ρ0)
1− Φ(−c) (11)
in the private sector, for c = 1. If we evaluate these expressions at the sample means of the explana-
tory variables and the parameter estimates, we obtain ̂P (ys ≥ 8|s = 1) = 0.612 and ̂P (ys ≥ 8|s = 0) =
0.577. Thus, government workers have on average a slightly higher probability of being highly satis-
fied. We have seen a similar result already in the pooled ordered probit estimates with government
sector dummy variable (Table 2). Hidden behind this average effect is a large amount of individual
heterogeneity and a self-selection process based on comparative advantage. The “treatment effect
on the treated”, as suggested by the above analysis, is much larger indeed.
5.3 Evidence from the German Socio-Economic Panel
In this section, we repeat the analysis of public-private sector well-being with data from the 2004
wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel. Our interest in the GSOEP data stems from the fact
that these data allow for estimating an extended model with additional controls for preference
heterogeneity. The first three columns of Table 4 show results for a model that closely resembles
the one estimated with ESS data. The coefficients have mostly the same signs and magnitudes, and
the same coefficients are significantly different from zero. The pattern of selection on unobservables
is similar as well: the correlation between ε and u1 is insignificant, whereas the correlation between
ε and u0 is negative and significant: those more likely matched to the public sector have a below
average well-being in the private sector. The coefficient is somewhat smaller than in the ESS data.
−−−−−−−−−
Table 4 about here
−−−−−−−−−
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The extended model includes a number of preference controls – the importance of helping, of a
successful career, and of social and political activism, and a favorable attitude towards risk taking.
As a group, these additional variables are highly significant, as evident from a likelihood ratio test.
They also show interesting individual patterns of significance. The effect of placing high importance
on one’s career is only significant in the private sector but not so in the public sector. Fittingly,
people who value their career highly are more likely to work in the private sector. A similar pattern
is observed for risk taking: people who are more willing to take risks are more likely to be found
in the private sector where they receive a significant return to the match.
With more observables included, we expect that the scope for selection on unobservables might
be somewhat diminished. And this is the case indeed. The difference between ρ1 and ρ0 decreases,
from 0.58 in the model without controls for preference heterogeneity to 0.41 in the model with these
variables included. In addition, standard errors increase. While the point estimates still suggest
selection on unobservables (and, given the size of the coefficients, a large rent for public sector
workers), the null hypothesis of random matching cannot be rejected in this extended model. Of
course, the power of this test may not be high, and we caution against abandoning the endogenous
selection model too quickly. We find this evidence from the GSOEP data as generally supportive
of our argument that preference heterogeneity has a role to play in the choice of workers between
public and private sector employment.
5.4 Gains from Matching
The gains from matching, based on the ESS data and the Table 3 estimates, are illustrated in
Figure 4, where we display the predicted aggregate happiness distribution under two scenarios.
The first one, in dark grey bars, shows the actual distribution in the sample. Hence, it reflects the
choices of people and incorporates the gains from sorting and matching. The second scenario is
a counterfactual one. We ask the question, what would happen if people were randomly assigned
to the two sectors, without taking preference heterogeneity into account, while keeping the sector
sizes unchanged, i.e., 16 percent of the worker population are assigned to the government sector,
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and 84 percent are assigned to the private sector. For a worker with average characteristics, we
obtain the predicted happiness distribution as
̂P (y = j|x¯) = 0.16 ∗ ̂P (y1 = j|x¯) + 0.84 ∗ ̂P (y0 = j|x¯)
We see that the sorting based on comparative advantage shifts the happiness distribution to the
right relative to the random matching case. For example, the probability of being very satisfied
( ̂P (y ≥ 8)) is increased by 5 percentage points due to endogenous matching.
−−−−−−−−−
Figure 4 about here
−−−−−−−−−
The graphical and numerical results thus indicate significant welfare gains from sorting and
matching in the labor market that were not and could not be measured with traditional approaches.
Accordingly, we are not aware of any previous results on the gains from matching that could serve
as a benchmarkfor the effect estimated here. There are, however, many studies estimating the loss
in subjective well-being due to individual unemployment (see Frey and Stutzer 2002, chapter 5 for
a review), probably the most extreme case of a mismatch. For the same set of countries in the
ESS, we find that the fraction of employed or self-employed people reporting a satisfaction score of
8 or more is 57.4 percent while it is only 33.5 percent for unemployed people. Thus the gains from
sectoral matching shift about a fifth as many people into the category of very satisfied people as
employment as such.13
Moreover, the overall result hides large gains from matching for people working in the govern-
ment sector and small average losses for people working in the private sector. The latter effect is
due to the politically determined size of the government sector restricting access to government
employment. It means that with random allocation, on average, 16 percent of the private sector
13The raw difference in the fraction of very satisfied people between employed and unemployed people does not
account for selection and differences in baseline satisfaction, but rather serves as a first approximation.
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workers were to be employed in the government sector that would have made them better off, on
average. However, not all people employed in the private sector would have benefited from random
allocation. As seen in Figure 3, those most likely to work in the private sector are indeed better
off in the private than in the government sector and thus benefit from sorting as well.
6 Concluding Remarks
According to standard economic decision calculus, individuals choose their jobs to attain an optimal
match between job characteristics and their preferences. As far as an individual is not the marginal
worker in a job, he or she benefits from a rent, i.e. a utility premium from matching. In general
terms of traditional welfare economics, workers’ sorting maximizes consumer and producer rents.
Empirically, it is very difficult to get a grip on this fundamental source of well-being in society.
Traditional approaches are based on the theory of equalizing differences and are restricted to analyze
observed behavior at the margin. Thereby, the degree of preference heterogeneity and resulting
welfare gains from matching remain very difficult to take into consideration.
Here, we propose a completely different approach. People’s reports of their subjective well-
being are taken as a proxy measure for their utility. It thus becomes possible to address the
welfare gains from matching with minimal structural assumptions and no information about specific
job characteristics in the two sectors. We introduce a two-equation ordered probit model with
endogenous switching. This is the most basic model to capture the idea that there are individual
specific gains in well-being from working in a particular sector and that people self-select into
sectors according to these relative advantages.
The model is applied to study sorting between government and private sector jobs for a sample
of 29,584 workers from 18 European countries. We find that there is sectoral sorting based on
relative advantage. The resulting gains in subjective well-being relative to a random allocation of
workers to the two sectors are considerable: The fraction of very satisfied workers increases from
53.8 to 58.8 percent. Additional results from the German Socio-Economic Panel suggest that the
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gains to selection on unobservables might be substantially diminished if one can include a larger
number of controls capturing inter-individual preference heterogeneity.
There are at least one implication of substance and one of methodology in research on individual
well-being from this study. First, the study highlights matching on the labor market as a potentially
very important determinant of well-being in society. We expect that these gains in well-being
depend on labor market institutions. In fact, an important motivation for state unemployment
benefits is the concern that gains from matching are lost if people cannot afford to search for
appropriate employment.
Second, the empirical findings make clear that the well-being gains from acting in a particular
environment like working in the government rather than in the private sector are individual specific,
i.e., heterogeneous. In situations where people have choice, this leads to self-selection. Accordingly,
the well-being consequences of different environmental conditions can neither be assessed from
simply comparing individuals’ well-being across environments nor from studying changes in well-
being for those who voluntarily change environments. The latter advice of caution applies also
to panel studies that account for individual specific fixed effects. Such models estimate the true
well-being differential only if their are no idiosyncratic gains from choice.
The implications of our model extend to all situations where people can choose their environ-
ment. This calls for a cautious interpretation of previous findings in economic research on people’s
happiness. For example, the findings in cohort and panel studies on the correlation between mari-
tal status and subjective well-being (e.g. Easterlin 2005, Stutzer and Frey 2006) or education, the
number of children, etc. and subjective well-being might seriously change. In contrast, self-selection
might play a minor role in assessing the psychic costs of unemployment (e.g. Clark and Oswald
1994, Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998) or the welfare consequences of democratic institutions
(e.g. Frey and Stutzer 2000). We see our contribution as a first step to a better understanding of
the gains in happiness where people self-select into situations that match their preferences best.
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Table 1. Descriptive Evidence on Preference Heterogeneity
How important is it for you to important/very important (in percent)
Public Sector Private Sector
a) help other people? 90.4 89.6
b) have a succesful career? 73.2 76.1 **
c) be an engaged citizen? 40.7 25.6 **
To what extent are you prepared
to take risks in life? (0/10) 5.0 5.2 **
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, 2004, Men, N=4181
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Table 2. Ordered Probit Regression Models of Public and Private Sector Well-Being (European
Social Survey 2002/2004, N=29’584)
Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction
Ordered Probit Models Probit
Single equations Switching regression
Variable mean Public Private Selection
Public sector 0.16 0.080** 0.019
(0.016) (0.016)
Household size 1.66 0.093** 0.050 0.101** 0.056**
(0.016) (0.043) (0.018) (0.026)
Female 0.45 0.072** 0.113** 0.065** 0.328**
(0.012) (0.029) (0.013) (0.018)
Age∗10−1 4.09 0.341** -0.481** -0.325** 0.305**
(0.036) (0.104) (0.038) (0.058)
Age squared∗10−3 1.80 0.398** 0.525** 0.386** -0.215**
(0.043) (0.122) (0.046) (0.069)
Married 0.58 0.179** 0.269** 0.162** 0.017
(0.015) (0.037) (0.016) (0.022)
Years of schooling∗10−1 1.29 0.239** 0.157** 0.255** 0.911**
(0.016) (0.042) (0.018) (0.026)
Citizen 0.94 0.064** 0.108 0.059** 0.533**
(0.025) (0.099) (0.026) (0.050)
Father in pub.sec. 0.05 0.029 -0.018 0.046 0.198**
(0.027) (0.055) (0.031) (0.038)
Log-Likelihood -57’028.5 -56’764.3 -56’742.3 -12’253.4
Notes: asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
** / * indicates statistical significance at the 1/5 percent level.
An additional ten threshold parameters were estimated for each ordered probit model.
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Table 3. Ordered Probit Switching Regression Models With Self-Selection (European Social Survey
2002/2004, N=29’584)
Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction
Model 1 Model 2
Public Private Selection Public Private Selection
Household size 0.046 0.075** 0.041 0.055 0.075** 0.040
(0.043) (0.018) (0.025) (0.054) (0.018) (0.025)
Female 0.082 -0.020 0.309** 0.134 0.021 0.308**
(0.058) (0.013) (0.017) (0.274) (0.013) (0.017)
Age∗10−1 -0.507** -0.356** 0.301** -0.442 -0.357** 0.302**
(0.109) (0.037) (0.059) (0.338) (0.037) (0.059)
Age squared∗10−3 0.543** 0.386** -0.224** 0.489* 0.388** -0.226**
(0.123) (0.045) (0.069) (0.285) (0.045) (0.069)
Married 0.265** 0.146** 0.031 0.269** 0.144** 0.032
(0.038) (0.015) (0.022) (0.037) (0.016) (0.022)
Years of schooling∗10−1 0.064 0.006 0.899** 0.223 0.004 0.896**
(0.153) (0.023) (0.024) (0.811) (0.022) (0.024)
Citizen 0.503** 0.157 0.042 0.522**
(0.048) (0.493) (0.026) (0.049)
Father in pub. sec. 0.191** -0.005 0.014 0.198**
(0.034) (0.182) (0.031) (0.037)
ρ -0.126 -0.684** 0.091 -0.694**
(0.201) (0.031) (1.165) (0.031)
Log-Likelihood -68’971.8 -68’970.4
Notes: see Table 2.
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Table 4. Ordered Probit Switching Regression Models With Controls for Preference Heterogeneity
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(German Socio-Economic Panel 2004, N=4184)
Dependent Variable: Job Satisfaction
Without preference heterogeneity With preference heterogeneity
Public Private Selection Public Private Selection
Age∗10−1 -0.986** -0.162 -0.586** -0.959** -0.172 -0.548**
(0.375) (0.190) (0.237) (0.383) (0.192) (0.240)
Age squared∗10−2 1.223** 0.154 0.811** 1.187** 0.187 0.741**
(0.434) (0.222) (0.270) (0.441) (0.225) (0.274)
Married 0.097 0.136** -0.074 0.087 0.143** -0.091*
(0.088) (0.042) (0.053) (0.089) (0.043) (0.054)
Years of schooling∗10−1 0.140 -0.085 0.683** 0.083 -0.073 0.630**
(0.222) (0.094) (0.079) (0.210) (0.097) (0.082)
Poor Health -0.194** -0.161** 0.020* -0.196** -0.163** 0.018*
(0.020) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010)
Importance career 0.048 0.101** -0.125**
(0.089) (0.043) (0.053)
Importance helping 0.403** 0.111* -0.005
(0.115) (0.058) (0.076)
Soc./pol. engagement 0.041 0.009 0.323**
(0.111) (0.050) (0.049)




Father in pub. sec. 0.255** 0.280**
(0.095) (0.098)
ρ 0.142 -0.434** 0.076 -0.313
(0.360) (0.182) (0.349) (0.211)
Log-Likelihood -9’999.9 -9’956.4
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Figure 1: Differences in preferences and perceptions of job characteristics between government and
private sector workers in 23 countries 1997 .
Notes: The bars reflect the mean differences of the answers, elicited on a six point scale, between public and
private sector employees; ∗∗ is significant at the 1 percent level, ∗ at the 5 percent level, and (∗) at the 10 percent
level. The differences are calculated based on the pooled sample for all 25 countries in the ISSP, except the USA
and the Netherlands where the required sector information is not available. Standard errors are adjusted for possible
clustering at the country level. People working in publicly owned firms, cooperatives and non-profit organization are
excluded. The numbers of observations vary between 12,365 and 14,480.
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Figure 2: Happiness distribution for government and private sector employees.
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Figure 3: Predicted probability of being very happy (a score of 8 or above) for government and
private sector employees by ε (the error in the selection equation)
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Figure 4: Predicted aggregate life satisfaction distribution (0-10 scale) under self-selection (dark
grey) and random matching (light grey)
Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2004, pooled data.
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